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Modern monetary policy analysis is built around the concept of an interest rate rule that 
responds to both inflation and output. This paper evaluates the quantitative implications 
of having a policy rule target different definitions of the output gap in a New Keynesian 
model with endogenous capital. One crucial result is that different model specifications 
result in alternative values for potential output, raising the issue of which output gap to 
target. The results of this paper suggest that targeting the true output gap can be well 
approximated by a rule that only reacts to inflation.   
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1. Introduction 
Ever since Taylor (1993) analysed monetary policy within the context of a Taylor rule, 
the incorporation of some measure of the output gap is a common feature in both 
empirical and theoretical research. Nevertheless, the concept used to denote the output 
gap has rarely been consistent among researchers and policymakers, as several definitions 
have been provided. However, the use of different output gap concepts will lead to 
different paths for the monetary policy instrument in its aim at stabilising output and 
inflation, with consequences not only for these two variables, but also for all other 
endogenous variables in the models considered. This issue was highlighted by McCallum 
(2001) within the context of a simple New Keynesian model without capital and an 
inelastic labour supply. The purpose of this paper is to extend McCallum’s framework to 
consider the quantitative importance of responding to the output gap in a model with a 
richer supply side. 
Most central banks attempt to stabilise not only the inflation rate, but also the output level 
around its potential, even if this element is unobserved. Furthermore, to the extent that 
the output gap, however it is defined, is related to real marginal costs, this will also have 
an effect on inflation via the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC). As argued by the 
ECB (2000, p. 37) “(...) particular caution is required when drawing conclusions with 
regard to policy which are based on estimates of the level of the output gap”. As the ECB 
again argues, potential output should not measure the level of output at which all inputs 
would be fully utilised. This argument makes sense not only because marginal costs rise 
steeply at high degrees of factor utilisation, but also because labour input will vary over   3 
the cycle, even in the absence of nominal rigidities but in response to changes in real 
variables.  
At its core, discussions regarding the output gap can be divided into two, those that 
measure them as the temporary fluctuations in output, and those that make the distinction 
that treat the output gap as the difference between cyclical output and its flexible price 
counterpart. The former concept is commonly used in applied studies (e.g., Mehra, 1993 
and Clarida Gali and Gertler, 2000), whereas the latter seems to feature more prominently 
in theoretical research (e.g. Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1999 and McCallum and Nelson, 
1999) . From a theoretical perspective it is clear that the difference between current 
(cyclical) output and flexible price output is the correct measure, even if many current 
discussions reveal the fact that this issue is still not well understood
2. Nevertheless, it is 
also possible that the error that arises from using cyclical output as a proxy for the output 
gap is quantitatively small, although given the considerable amount of dissatisfaction in 
using de-trended output to estimate the NKPC
3 . Furthermore, an additional problem may 
arise even when there is consensus regarding the appropriate definition of the output gap, 
since models with different specifications will result in different measures of flexible 
price output. Therefore, the above discussion regarding the output gap is not one of 
uncertain measurement, but of different concepts. 
The above considerations suggest that analysing the quantitative consequences of using 
alternative definitions of the output gap in a monetary policy rule
4 can highlight its 
                                                 
2 Indeed, at a recent economic seminar at HM Treasury this was an issue of debate and many commentators 
argued that the government should try to minimise all output fluctuations in output. From a theoretical 
standpoint, this objective is clearly undesirable. 
3 See for example, Galí and Gertler (1999). 
4 For the purposes of this paper it is not necessary that the monetary authorities be maximising any 
particular welfare function.   4 
practical importance. With this purpose in mind, this paper develops a New Keynesian, 
sticky-price model with endogenous capital and habit formation in consumption. An 
advantage of using this framework is that the results regarding the output gap are more 
general than those in McCallum and Nelson (1999) and McCallum (2001).  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model; section 3 discusses the 
alternative definitions of the output gap to be used; section 4 will compare the model’s 
performance as the monetary policy rule reacts to the different concepts of the output 
gap, with emphasis not only on the relative volatility of the endogenous variables, but 
also the persistence of shocks. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2 The model 
2.1 Households 
The economy is populated by a large number of households making decisions in the 
present given expectations about the future. The representative household, which 


















































E         (1) 
where  t c  is a composite consumption good,  t m  are real money balances and  t n denotes 
labour input. β  is the household’s discount factor and h [0,1) measures the degree of 
habit formation in consumption (see Fuhrer, 2000). Real money balances enter the utility   5 
function as these reduce the amount of resources required to undertake market 
transactions.  
The representative household produces its differentiated good given a production 
function  ) , ( t t t t z n k f y =  where  t z  represents a technology shock, and  t k  and  t n  denote 















where  ) (i P t is the nominal price of the good produced by the 
household,  t P  is the aggregate price level and  t Y  is aggregate demand. 
The household maximises lifetime utility (1) at t by choosing a sequence for 
consumption, labour, money balances, one period bonds ( 1 + t b )  with a real price of 
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where δ is the depreciation rate,  t w  is the real wage,  t T  are lump-sum taxes, 
d
t n and 
s
t n are the amount of labour demanded and supplied by the household, respectively and 
t π represents the inflation rate ( 1 / 1 − − t t P P ). It is now well known that sticky price with 
endogenous capital can lead to unrealistically high volatility in the endogenous variables 
at very high frequency (Ellison and Scott, 2001). Consequently, investment incurs 
adjustment costs,  ) , ( t t k x C , as in Casares and McCallum (2000), where  t x , investment, is 
related to the capital stock by the equation   6 
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with the production function being 
t z
t t t t t e n k z n k f
α α = ) , (                 (6) 
 
Letting  t λ  and  t µ  denote the Lagrange multipliers on (2) and (5), respectively, the 
optimality conditions are (2), (5) and
5: 
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5 It is also assumed that the transversality conditions hold.   7 
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2.2 Market clearing. 
For general equilibrium, the labour market clears and the economy is subject to the 





t n n =                     (15) 
 
t t t t t t g k x C x c y + + + = ) , (                 (16)   
   8 
Fiscal policy is given by an exogenous process for government expenditure and the 
central bank’s monetary policy instrument is a short-term interest rate, given by 
) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 + + + = + t t t t E r R π . 
 
 
2.3 Linear Model 
In order to analyse the model’s dynamic properties, the optimality conditions obtained 
above are linearised around the steady state
6. The result is a linear rational expectations 
model with the following equations
7: 
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6 “Hats” denote the percentage deviation from steady state and capital letters represent steady-state values. 
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There are nine equations and eleven variables and the two remaining equations to 
complete the model pertain to pricing decisions and the monetary policy rule. Regarding 
the former, sticky prices á la Calvo (1983) will be posited, so as to generate a New 
Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC), which would be purely forward looking. In the case of 
linearisation around a non-zero steady-state and allowing firms that are unable to re-
optimise to simply adjust their prices by the previous period’s inflation rate yields a 
Phillips curve of the type proposed by Fuhrer and Moore. Given the considerable amount 
of debate concerning the suitability of each specification both formulations will be 
considered. Hence, the initial Phillips curve formulation will be: 
 
t t t t t c m E ˆ ) 1 ( 1 1 0 1 0 φ π φ π φ π + − + = − +               (26) 
With  1 φ  ( 0 f ) reflecting the degree of price rigidity.   10 
2.4 Monetary Policy. 
The general approach to modelling monetary policy consists of the setting of a short-term 
nominal interest rate that responds to deviations from some target for both inflation and 
output, and also allows for some interest rate smoothing
8: 
 
[ ] t R t t t t R y R , 1 3 2 1 3
~ ) 1 ( ε µ µ π µ µ + + + − = −           (27) 
 
t y ~  represents the output gap that the monetary authorities respond to, and  t R, ε  represents 
an i.i.d. monetary policy shock. One could of course argue, as in McCallum (2001) and 
McCallum and Nelson (1999) that the above rule is not operational, but modifying it will 
not alter the main results of this paper. What is necessary, however, is that the coefficient 
on inflation,  1 µ , be greater than unity to ensure stability.  
 
2.5 Sources of shocks. 
  The model includes four shocks: technology, cost-push, policy rule shocks and 
exogenous changes in government expenditure. As shown by Clarida, Galí and Gertler 
(1999), under perfect information, with purely forward-looking inflation and in the 
absence of cost-push shocks the monetary authorities could use the policy rule to fully 
offset all other shocks and perfectly stabilise both output and inflation. This ignores the 
shocks to the policy rule itself and for the purposes of the analysis presented here a rule 
such as (27) is a good approximation to actual monetary policy, even if it is not derived 
from optimising behaviour. Technology shocks lead to an increase in output (fall in the 
                                                 
8 Representative among these are McCallum and Nelson (1999), Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000).   11 
output gap) and a fall in the inflation rate. To the extent that the monetary authorities 
want to stabilise employment, they will attempt to offset temporary technology shocks, 
but this will exacerbate the negative effect on the output gap, and in this sense there is a 
trade-off. Another trade-off arises with the cost-push shock, which leads to both an 
increase in inflation and a fall in output, whereas this does not arise with fiscal and 
monetary policy shocks. 
 
3. Calibration. 
This section assigns parameter values to the above equations to make them directly 
comparable to the literature on NK business cycle analysis, such as Casares and 
McCallum (2001) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1999). 
σ , which determines the sensitivity of consumption to the real interest rate and the 
degree of consumption smoothing, will be set to 0.2, as in McCallum and Nelson (1999)
9. 
For h, the standard value of 0.8, as in Fuhrer (2000) will be adopted. The two parameters 
ψ  and η that determine the adjustment costs are chosen, as in Casares and McCallum 
(2001), to lead to an elasticity of investment with respect to the real interest rate of 2.5 
per cent, and to amount to 1 per cent of output in the steady state. 
The labour share will be set at 0.3, and the time discount factor β  to 0.995, implying a 
steady-state real interest rate of 2 per cent and ξ  equals 1, as in Galí (2003). 
The δ will be set at 0.025. 
 
 
                                                 
9 McCallum (2001) argues in favour of 0.4, but in the context of a model without capital or investment.   12 
 
Table 1: Calibration 
Parameter  Value 
α   0.3 
β   0.995 
δ   0.025 
η  2.55 
θ   6 
z ρ   0.95 
z σ   0.0925 
eR σ   0.0135 
1 µ   1.5 
2 µ   0.1 
0 φ   0.5 










   13 
4. Output gap concepts. 
How is the output gap to be defined? McCallum (2001) makes the definition clear
10: it is 
the difference between cyclical output and its flexible price level. Under fully flexible 
prices the mark-up is constant, so that  t n t f w , Θ = . In a model without capital
11 and an 
inelastic labour supply, as in McCallum and Nelson (1999), the output gap is directly 
related to movements in labour. However, in  a more fully developed model with 
endogenous investment and allowing for some degree of labour supply elasticity, such as 
the one presented above, this is no longer the case. Labour supply will fluctuate even in 
the absence of nominal rigidities, in response to real shocks. Furthermore, capacity output 
is variable, but as Neiss and Nelson (2001) and Woodford (2004) argue, it is not clear 
what kind of capacity output should be used to define the natural level of output. One 
could obtain the level of output under fully flexible prices and use that as the natural and 
capacity rate. However, this poses the problem that capacity output is dependent of the 
labour supply under flexible prices and the existing capital stock, instead of its 
hypothetical flex-price level. Neiss and Nelson (2001) argue in favour of using the fully 
flexible level in order to avoid the potentially destabilising effects of monetary policy 
shocks, but from an applied perspective this approach is unappealing. A further similar 
problem arises when models embody habit formation in consumption. In this case, lagged 
consumption levels have an effect on labour supply, so when considering capacity output 
should one take the lagged level of consumption that would have prevailed under flexible 
prices or the actual lagged value? Again, to the extent that labour supply is affected by 
                                                 
10 Other definitions, all implying much the same concept can be found in Neiss and Nelson (2002, fn. 7). 
11 Or, alternatively, exogenous capital.   14 
previous values, households will not consider what they would have chosen in a 
hypothetical flex-price world, but their actual values in the previous period. 
 It is clear then that although there is an emerging consensus on what the concept of the 
should be, allowing for endogenous state variables (in this case, the current period capital 
stock and lagged consumption) creates a potential source of conflict when trying to 
define capacity output. Nevertheless, an issue that Neiss and Nelson (2001) do not 
consider is whether the difference between the two concepts is quantitatively important, 
and this will be discussed further below. 
Therefore, this paper will consider four different concepts of the output gap and their 
effects:  the deviation of output from a linear trend, that is, defining cyclical output
12 as 
the output gap, deviations of employment from the steady state level, as in McCallum and 
Nelson (1999) and the “true” output gap, where both definitions of capacity output 




5. Monetary Policy and the Output Gap: Quantitative Implications. 
5.1 Impulse responses. 
This section evaluates the consequences of using alternative concepts of the output gap in 
the monetary policy rule by analysing the impulse responses to each of the four shocks 
considered above and also for the volatility of the endogenous variables.  
                                                 
12 HP filtering would lead to the same conclusion.   15 
All models share the same calibrated values as presented in Table 1, except for the 
monetary policy rule. In model 1 the parameter  2 µ , reflecting the reaction of the interest 
rate to the output gap, is set to zero; in model 2, the central bank reacts to cyclical output, 
that is,  t t y y ˆ ~ = . In the third model, the central bank react to changes in the employment 
level, as in McCallum and Nelson (1999) assumed for the case of a sticky-price economy 
with no capital and an inelastic labour supply. In models 4 and 5 the output gap 
represents the deviation of output from its flexible price level, except that in the former 
the fully flexible price model is considered, whereas for the latter actual lagged 
consumption and current capital affect capacity output.  
 
Figure 1: Technology Shock. 
 
The dashed lines represent model 3, the dotted lines model 2 and the remaining models 
(indistinguishable) are represented by the solid line. The reason that the variables respond   16 
differently in this context is a direct consequence of the systematic component of 
monetary policy. A positive technology shock generally leads to an increase in output and 
a fall in inflation. However, in model 2, because the monetary authorities are trying to 
dampen all fluctuations in output, regardless of their source, output falls by less than in 
the other models, but with the secondary effect of a greater effect on inflation. In the case 
of model 3, as is common in sticky price models, a temporary technological shock leads 
to an increase in output, but accompanied by a fall in employment. To offset the effect of 
z on employment output is stimulated further, so that output increases even further and 
the effect on inflation is positive
13. Interestingly, when the monetary authorities do not 
react to any output gap concept, the response is virtually indistinguishable from that of 
reacting to the theoretical gaps. 
 
5.2 Consequences of alternative rules on the variables’ volatilities. 
Table 2 presents the volatilities of five variables under each of the model specifications. 
Model 2 is the most successful in achieving its task of reducing fluctuations in cyclical 
output (and consequently, investment), but this comes at the cost of over a tripling in the 
volatility of the inflation rate and the nominal interest rate
14, so that the costs associated 
with this rule are very high. Model 3, which responded to movements in employment, 
results in the highest volatility of output and investment, for the reasons discussed above, 
but its performance is not that different from the other models, except in the lower 
volatility of inflation. Most importantly however, is the fact that if the central bank 
                                                 
13 The effect on inflation is different in McCallum and Nelson (1999) because in their model reacting to 
employment is equivalent to targeting the true output gap. 
14 It should be recalled that one of the arguments put forward to support the existence of interest rate 
smoothing was the monetary authorities’ desire to maintain a stable interest rate.   17 
responds to one of the two theoretical output gap concepts or does not target output at all 
lead a an indistinguishable performance in terms of the volatilities of the variables. One 
reaches very similar conclusions when the model without habit formation in consumption 
is analysed, as shown on Table 3. It is worth emphasising however, that in the present 
context a lower degree of inflation volatility will in general improve welfare
15, but that 
this is not necessarily the case for output, since the latter will also be subject to real 
shocks. 
Two key results emanate from this analysis. Firstly, if the central bank responds to the 
output gap, as measured by the departure of output from its flexible price level, then it 
does not matter quantitatively whether it is the theoretical level of output than one uses or 
the level of output conditional on past values. 
 
TABLE 2:STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
  Y σ   x σ   π σ   R σ  
Model1  1.84  2.99  0.49  0.47 
Model2  1.74  2.71  1.81  1.59 
Model3  1.93  3.39  0.55  0.22 
Model4  1.84  2.98  0.51  0.47 
Model5  1.84  2.98  0.50  0.46 
 
 
Secondly, ignoring output altogether leads to a level of economic performance that is 
virtually indistinguishable from one that targets the correct output gap. Moreover, given 
the additional uncertainties that would arise if the policy rule analysed above were made 
operational and ignorance about the flexible price level of output, the costs, in terms of 
volatilities, of reacting to output gaps are likely to be even higher. Clearly, by raising the 
                                                 
15 As argued by McCallum (2001), an explicit welfare is not always necessary when analysing alternative 
monetary policy rules.   18 




TABLE 3:STANDARD DEVIATIONS (NO HABIT FORMATION) 
  Y σ   x σ   π σ   R σ  
Model1  1.37  3.27  0.52  0.53 
Model2  1.28  3.03  1.45  1.32 
Model3  1.53  3.83  1.00  0.57 
Model4  1.37  3.26  0.53  0.53 





Monetary policy rules that include the deviation of the inflation rate and output from 
some target measure have become a common feature of monetary policy analysis. By 
including some measure of the output gap, including detrended output, in the policy rule, 
it is believed that the effects will be beneficial, in the form of reduced fluctuations. This 
ignores the fact that some of these fluctuations in output arise as a consequence of real 
shocks in the economy, and trying to offset these should not be an objective for 
policymakers. 
  In 2001 McCallum concluded that the monetary authorities should not respond 
strongly to the output gap. Aside from issues of operationality  or the correct 
measurement of the output gap, using the wrong concept of the output gap leads to a 
serious worsening of the model’s behaviour. But the true level of potential output is 
model specific, so that by varying the modelling of the labour market or the inclusion of   19 
capital, one obtains a different measure of output under flexible prices, just like real 
business cycles would. Consequently, reacting to McCallum and Nelson’s (1999) 
measure of the output gap yields results that are worse than not targeting the gap at all. 
Given the above, one is driven to conclude not that it is undesirable to respond strongly to 
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